Audit of Operational Controls at
Ports of Entry (Based on the
1996 Tassé Report) – Final Report
2.1.2 Follow-Up to Management Issues
The audit team observed that regional offices or local ports of entry sometimes make decisions of an operational control nature that “technically” deviate from the national stance. For example, at some ports of entry in Western Canada, immigration officers had decided not to handle SAP and the Point-of-Sale (POS) cash recovery system until the operations to undertake a transaction within SAP/POS were “simplified.” This was a decision that, as far as employees at these ports of entry were concerned, made operations smoother and still achieved the objective of handling public monies in an accountable fashion.
Only recently have some of the regions begun establishing a process for audits and reviews of financial operations, such as internal controls. However, at the time of the audit, none had been conducted.
With respect to operational controls for public monies and immigration key control forms, little discretion exists to deviate from national procedures in certain areas. Monies and immigration key control forms have to be held securely, whether in a large or small port of entry.
The audit team did observe that certain operational controls just don’t “work” in a very small port of entry. For example, it is next to impossible to segregate duties when there are four staff members in a port of entry and shift work is involved. This lack of segregation of duties is particularly true with respect to handling public monies.
In section 2.3.3, Future Initiatives for Cost Recovery, the Department is encouraged to consider an arrangement whereby CCRA would collect monies on behalf of CIC. Currently, three ports of entry in two regions have made this arrangement. The arrangement with one region was made at the local level in 1996. The second arrangement was made at the regional level in December 2000. The audit team applauds the initiative but suggests that such a joint venture be supported nationally. In some of the regions, CIC and CCRA were discussing further joint efforts in revenue collection. Having CCRA collecting monies on behalf of the Department benefits CIC because the attendant responsibilities of handling public monies are reduced considerably for the ports of entry. This initiative can occur only when CIC and CCRA are conveniently co-located.
During 1997-98, there was an in-depth study of how the Department did business at ports of entry. The focus of the study was on issues surrounding examination, refugee determination and facilitation, enforcement and control. The Working Group on Port of Entry Review prepared issue papers covering 33 topics.
The Department hosted a National Port of Entry Conference from October 11-13, 2000, the first since 1997. This meeting brought together more than 85 National Headquarters (NHQ) and regional managers and port of entry employees, with CCRA, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as partners. Key topics included the relationship between regions and NHQ, the MOU with CCRA, border vision and other partnerships, and streamlining and improving efficiency, while balancing facilitation with enforcement.
This conference and the review of ports of entry operations covered many and varied issues affecting ports of entry, such as increased migration, handling of refugee claims, the use of force, increasing criminality, co-mingling at airports, point of finality, performance measurement, client service measurement, intelligence, missing children, border patrols, and pressures for efficient service from businesses, airlines and airport authorities.
Numerous subjects have been discussed and reviewed over the years that affect port of entry operations. Since the Tassé report, the practices relating to the operational controls for the handling of public monies and immigration key control forms have not been reviewed. The handling of public monies and document control are essentially “outputs” of port of entry processes. They are outputs in the sense that after a decision-making process has occurred, the individual is given a document, for which a fee has been charged. That document allows the individual to enter Canada. There are policies and procedures in the Service and Administration Manual on immigration key control forms, badges and uniforms, and in the Finance Manual on handling of monies.
The recommendations made in the Tassé report were made in light of the organization’s structure—national functional groups providing guidance to diverse groups across the country. At NHQ, functional groups such as Finance and Administration establish the policies and procedures to be followed with regard to operational controls, as mentioned above.
The Tassé report called for national functional groups to establish broad operational control objectives and policies, and for regional and local management to develop their own detailed procedures. The Tassé report recognized that such a balancing act occurs in all regional operations, to a limited extent. When NHQ sends out a directive, regional offices convey that message and provide some procedures and guidance for achieving the Department’s objectives. It was observed that there are differences in capacity among the regional offices.
Conclusion
The audit team found weaknesses in operational controls (discussed in subsequent sections of this report). A number of these observations had been made in the 1996 Tassé report and had not been dealt with at the time of the current audit. Some policies have been revised, such as chapter 6 of the Service and Administration Manual, “Forms Management Program” (chapter SA6), which addresses immigration key control forms.
The Tassé report commented on the role of local and regional management in developing detailed control procedures. Regardless of who develops these procedures, they must be in place. Management at the ports of entry have the responsibility to ensure that controls are there.
- Date Modified:
