Audit of Operational Controls at
Ports of Entry (Based on the
1996 Tassé Report) – Final Report

2.3.5 Observations at the Ports of Entry

Exportable Data Collection System at Ports of Entry

All sites in Ontario and the Prairies, as well as Vancouver International Airport and Dorval International Airport, had the Exportable Data Collection System (EDCS). No other sites that we visited had this system. Given that EDCS ensures the immediate deposit of funds from credit card and debit card transactions into the Government of Canada’s bank account, and that it reduces the amount of cash on the premises, this system should be more widely used.

Segregation of Duties

We observed that at various sites across the country:

• immigration officers were performing SAP/POS transactions on the cashier’s machine, with the cashier’s password, and putting the funds in the cash drawer; and
• finance clerks were entering transactions into SAP/POS and were also responsible for the deposit function.

In our view, one staff member should not use another’s password to do transactions. In addition, the receipt of monies and the preparation of the deposit are two separate functions and should be done by different people, if possible.

Duplication of Effort and “Point”

At Pearson International Airport, there were dedicated cashiers (called shift clerks), who were often away from their work stations performing “point.” “Point” involves directing airline passengers into immigration, after they have been referred by CCRA for immigration secondary examination. Immigration officers were performing cost recovery transactions by taking the funds from clients, issuing a manual official receipt and turning the funds over to the shift clerk (either giving it to the person or placing it in the cash drawer). Then the shift clerk would enter the transaction into SAP/POS.

“Point” has resulted in an unnecessary duplication of effort. Even though the point task is in the shift clerk’s job description, consideration should be given to having another staff member carry out this function.

Combinations

At a number of ports of entry, we observed that all staff had the combination to the safe or access to the drop safe. We acknowledge that at some small sites, it is necessary for all parties to have the combination. But in a few instances, up to 25 people had access. Where possible, access to safes and drop safes should be restricted as much as possible.

In two sites, we observed that combinations were not regularly changed. Combinations should be changed regularly, especially after someone on staff has left.

Management of Cash Flow

At three ports of entry, we observed that deposits (section removed). Deposits should be made (section removed). One port of entry, due to its small size, was making deposits only about (section removed). The procedures at this site were such that the shift supervisor and one staff member would count cash together. Given shift work, the two were seldom on the same shift together to make the deposit. At this site, we also noted that the shift supervisor’s SAP access was occasionally restricted, preventing him from closing out without assistance from Regional Office.

Cash Float Procedures

At a number of ports of entry, we noted that:

• the cash float was not counted or signed for when the finance clerk arrived in the morning, or when he or she did the deposit;
• the cash float register did not always have the individual’s initials beside the amount of money transferred; and
• the cash float was not counted at the beginning of the shift.

Only those staff members who use the cash float should sign the register. To ensure accountability for funds, the person who has counted the cash float should initial the register. Since there are always different employees, it is important that the cash float be counted at the beginning of each shift.

In one port of entry, up to eight immigration officers could be carrying out cost recovery duties during a crossover shift. Since it is not practical for all of them to have their own cash floats, this port of entry has a common cash. We noted, however, that there was no indication of who had used the cash float.

In these circumstances, when officers have used the cash float to make change for a client, they should initial the register, indicating the amount of cash float they used and the date.

Security of Assets

At a number of sites, immigration officers regularly performed cost recovery transactions. After each transaction, they should have dropped the monies and documentation into the drop safe. However, we found that security procedures for financial assets were not always effective, and we observed a number of other weaknesses in this area.

• Cash floats and funds were kept in a cash drawer, and the key was either left in the cash drawer or made available to all staff.
• There was no sign-off sheet for the internal transfer of monies.
• There was no drop safe register.
• The drop safe was not opened in the presence of two people.
• Funds were not counted with a witness present.
• Manual official receipts were not secured.
• There was no custodianship function for manual official receipts.
• There was no log for signing the books out and in when they were filled.
• There was no verification of the completeness of the books when they had been used (verification to ensure that voided copies were retained in the book and that the office copy was maintained in the book).
• There was no random reconciliation of manual official receipts issued to the SAP/POS receipt.

These weaknesses could contribute to an unexplainable loss of funds.

Security at Ports of Entry

Generally, there was good perimeter security at the ports of entry visited, but we noted a few weaknesses that should be remedied.

• (section removed)

Recommendation 12: Regions should ensure that all sites have EDCS, where practical.

If, as recommended earlier in this report, CIC arranges to have CCRA’s cashier handle the cost recovery function where appropriate, a number of the weaknesses listed above would no longer be applicable. However, if CIC decides to keep handling cash, regions and ports of entry should do the following:

• segregate duties to the extent possible, given staff limitations;
• eliminate the sharing of passwords;
• relieve shift clerks from doing point, so they can serve as cashiers;
• change combinations regularly;
• make deposits on a timely basis;
• put appropriate cash float procedures in place; and
• maintain security of assets (cash floats, funds and manual official receipts).

Management Response

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Action Plan

The preferred option is to work with CCRA. However, where the CCRA solution cannot be implemented, EDCS or some other means of accepting electronic card payments will be implemented.

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