Vienna Mission
Final Audit Report
4.5 KEY DOCUMENTS MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
The audit team reviewed the management control framework for KDs. This
involved conducting interviews with staff; reviewing files, document control
registers and detailed usage logs; and undertaking a physical count of
all immigration control forms held in the immigration program’s
deep and working storage.
Because the last serial number of KDs was not recorded on the day of the
previous count, it was difficult to reconcile the physical count with
the paper record.
Forms Control Officer
The ICO has been delegated responsibility as the Vienna Mission’s FCO. Prior to his posting at the Vienna Mission, he was the FCO at another mission for three years. The FCO is cognizant of the responsibilities of this function. The backup to the FCO is the OM.
The FCO’s duties as the Vienna Mission’s ICO involve a significant amount of travel; therefore, certain required duties cannot be consistently undertaken on a day-to-day basis, such as signing out immigration control forms and randomly reviewing daily usage logs. For example, the third quarter inventory count did not occur until October 11, 2000, as the FCO was on travel status at the end of September. According to chapter SA 6 of the Forms Management Program, an officer undertaking the FCO position should spend 10 percent of his or her time reviewing internal controls, monitoring systems and preparing reports to ensure the security of the KD process. The FCO at the Vienna Mission is not able to devote 10 percent of his time to these functions.
Consideration should be given to having another officer, who is generally in the office, undertake this role. Since the Vienna Mission is a Regional Processing Centre, the other immigration CBOs go on area trips. The Department should look at appointing one of the two Canadian DIOs, on an exception basis, to undertake the FCO role.
Recommendation 16
With departmental permission, appoint a Canadian DIO as the FCO.
Management Response
This is contrary to IR policy because it is considered beyond the bounds of sound risk management.
Inventorying of Key Documents
Shipments of KDs are received in the DFAIT main registry at the Vienna Mission. The Vienna Mission’s security officer delivers the shipment to the FCO, who immediately opens the packages and catalogues them in the control registers. There is no other CBO present for this function.
Recommendation 17
Two CBOs should be present during the opening and inventorying of received KDs.
Management Response
Management agrees with this recommendation.
Security of Key Documents
KDs are maintained in deep storage,(section removed). Only the (section removed) and the (section removed). The working supply of IMM 1346s and IMM‑SEALS (section removed). The working supply generally consists of a (section removed). On occasion, when (section removed) is travelling, a small supply of IMM 1263s will be transferred to (section removed). The working supply of IMM 1000s and IMM 1442s (section removed). In addition to the (section removed).
Control Registers and Detailed Usage Logs
The Vienna Mission has a control register for each KD. When KDs are received from Canada, the serial numbers are recorded in the control form registers. When the KDs are removed to working storage, this fact is recorded. A review of the control registers revealed some deficiencies.
In October 2000, 7,000 IMM‑SEALS and 7,000 IMM 1346s were received. For both the IMM‑SEALS and IMM 1346s, only the serial numbers for the 4,500 that remained in the Vienna Mission were noted in the control registers. The balance (2,500 that were shipped to the Belgrade Mission) had no serial numbers recorded in the control register; however, there was e-mail documentation to show that these IMM 1346s and IMM‑SEALS had been shipped to and received by the Belgrade Mission.
When KDs (for example, IMM 1346s and IMM‑SEALS) are removed from deep storage to working storage, the FCO records in the control register the initials of the person who receives these KDs. The recipient of these KDs should write his or her own initials in the control register.
Due to the FCO’s heavy travel schedule, IMM 1263s are occasionally signed out to an officer, who maintains the IMM 1263s (section removed). A review of the control register did not reflect this procedure at all. The control register should reflect the sign-out of the IMM 1263s in these temporary circumstances.
When the LES member takes the IMM1346s for processing from the visitor visa officer, he only signs the daily usage log (referred to as the weekly summary – visitor visas and seals) after the visas have been placed in the applicants’ passports. Initially, when the LES member receives the IMM 1346s from the DIO visitor visa officer, he should sign the daily usage log to acknowledge receipt of the forms.
Recommendation 18
(a) All KDs received should be noted in the control register.
(b) The person who receives the KDs from deep storage to working storage should write his or her own initials in the control register as proof of receipt of such immigration control forms.
(c) All KDs that are removed from deep storage to working storage should be recorded in the control register.
Management Responses
(a) Management agrees with this recommendation and has implemented it.
(b) Management agrees with this recommendation and has implemented it.
(c) Management agrees with this recommendation and has implemented it.
Monitoring of Logs
The FCO conducts a very limited monitoring of the daily usage logs to ensure that there is no break in sequence and that the correct information is recorded. For example, the IMM 1346 daily usage log is generally checked only quarterly. The FCO is aware that it should be checked regularly, but because of his heavy travel schedule as the ICO, this monitoring does not occur more frequently. Also, the FCO does not use the printouts from CAIPS to confirm numerical sequence.
Recommendation 19
The FCO should randomly check the daily usage logs, as well as the CAIPS printouts, on a regular basis.
Management Response:
Management agrees with this recommendation and has implemented it.
Quarterly Inventories
The quarterly inventory of KDs (form 5392) requires the inclusion of all serial numbers of forms on hand. The review revealed that the FCO is only noting the serial numbers of the KDs in deep storage and not those in working storage. Unless the serial number is identified to start the counting process, a reliable reconciliation to form usage is difficult to achieve.
Recommendation 20
All the serial numbers for all the KDs in both deep and working storage should be recorded on form 5392.
Management Response
Management agrees with this recommendation and has implemented it.
Excess Immigration Control Forms
There are now more than (section removed) IMM 1263s and (section removed) IMM 1442s on hand. In a calendar quarter, generally 25 of each these KDs are issued. The Vienna Mission should consider transferring these excess KDs to NHQ or to another mission.
Destruction of Immigration Control Forms
Since the FCO has been at the Vienna Mission, there has been no destruction of KDs. During the review of the inventory, there were some series of very old KDs in deep storage. When instructions are received from Canada to destroy the recently replaced IMM 1346s (section removed) and IMM‑SEALS (section removed), the Vienna Mission should destroy the much older IMM 1346s (section removed) and IMM‑SEALS (section removed) as well.
In the (section removed), there is a drawer that contains old control registers and cancelled visas, which were obtained from departing immigration CBOs. The cancelled visas should be catalogued and destroyed in the presence of two CBOs. The older control registers should be filed.
(section removed), there is a box of old control registers and old cancelled
visas (from series that have ceased to exist for years). The contents
of this box should be reviewed, and then it should be destroyed.
Recommendation 21
The FCO should undertake the destruction of excess inventory that cannot be transferred to NHQ or to another mission.
Management Response
Management agrees with this recommendation and has destroyed the excess inventory.
Administrative Matters
A review of the KD files revealed that only packing slips from the last quarter are maintained.
Additionally, many of the faxed acknowledgements to NHQ did not have a date. In the file, the FCO should maintain the faxed copy of the acknowledgement to NHQ.
Recommendation 22
(a) All packing slips are to be maintained.
(b) Faxed acknowledgements of receipt of KDs are to be dated.
Management Responses
(a) Management agrees with this recommendation and has implemented it.
(b) Management agrees with this recommendation and has implemented it.
Satellites
The satellites of Sarajevo, Skopje and Zagreb have a small supply of IMM 1346s and IMM‑SEALS on hand. In these missions, if an urgent visa is required, the head of mission can issue one upon instruction from the Vienna Mission. The FCO advised that the KDs are maintained in a secure location at these missions.
To date, there have been no inventory counts undertaken by the FCO for the IMM 1346s and IMM‑SEALS in Sarajevo, Skopje and Zagreb. Given the fact that other immigration CBOs from the Vienna Mission make, on average, visits every two months to Sarajevo and Zagreb and quarterly visits to Skopje, the IPM should delegate one of these immigration CBOs to undertake an inventory count when he or she is on an area trip.
At the time of the audit, these three satellites had old IMM 1346s and IMM‑SEALS on hand. When instruction is received from NHQ, the FCO, or his delegate, should destroy them when a visit is made to the satellites.
Quarterly, the FCO will request from the three missions the number of IMM 1346s and IMM‑SEALS on hand, and the number issued or spoiled in the quarter. The FCO does not maintain a spreadsheet outlining the information on these KDs, with the serial numbers, at the Vienna Mission.
Recommendation 23
(a) The IPM should instruct the FCO, or delegate another CBO, to conduct an inventory count in Sarajevo, Skopje and Zagreb. Additionally, the FCO or delegated CBO should destroy old KDs, when necessary, in these three satellites.
(b) The FCO should maintain a spreadsheet of the status of KDs in Sarajevo, Skopje and Zagreb.
Management Responses
(a) Management agrees with this recommendation and has implemented it.
(b) Management agrees with this recommendation and has implemented it.
- Date Modified:
